Interpreting “cumulative extremism”:Six proposals for enhancing conceptual clarity by Busher, Joel & Macklin, Graham
Interpreting “cumulative extremism”: 
six proposals for enhancing conceptual 
clarity 
Busher, J. and Macklin, G. 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited in CURVE December 2015 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Busher, J. and Macklin, G. (2015) Interpreting “cumulative extremism”: six proposals for 
enhancing conceptual clarity. Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 27 (5): 884-905. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.870556 
 
Publisher statement:  This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & 
Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence on 12 June 2014, available 
online: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2013.870556. 
 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURVE is the Institutional Repository for Coventry University 
http://curve.coventry.ac.uk/open  
 1 
Paper accepted for publication in Terrorism and Political Violence 
 
Interpreting ‘Cumulative Extremism’: Six proposals for enhancing 
conceptual clarity 
 
Joel Busher and Graham Macklin  
 
In 2006, the political scientist Roger Eatwell urged that further attention be paid to ‘the way in which 
one form of extremism can feed off and magnify other forms [of extremism]’, a process he called 
‘cumulative extremism’1. Four years later, Eatwell and Goodwin went so far as to claim that processes 
of cumulative extremism (CE) could be ‘more threatening to the liberal democratic order than attacks 
from lone wolf extreme right-wingers or even al-Qaida-inspired spectacular bombings’2. Now, a further 
three years later, there is evidence that policy makers, practitioners and other academics working in 
fields such as counter-terrorism, counter-radicalisation and community cohesion are paying heed to 
these arguments, with the concept of CE, or variations on it – ‘tit-for-tat radicalisation’3, ‘cumulative 
radicalisation’4 or ‘connectivity between extremisms’5 – gaining considerable traction. Particularly in the 
UK, the term has become an increasingly common component of debates about ‘extremism’, usually 
being deployed to refer to the dynamic between extreme Islamist groups (those with their roots in the 
now-banned organisation Al-Muhajiroun) and the most vociferous anti-Muslim and extreme right-wing 
groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), the British National Party (BNP) and the National 
Front (NF).6 The concept is a regular feature of government-hosted workshops and planning 
meetings7, and appears in recent iterations of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy.8 
 
Interest in ‘cumulative extremism’ has intensified in the wake of recent events: the EDL and BNP 
demonstrations, as well as a series of attacks on mosques, that took place after Drummer Lee Rigby, of 
The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, was hacked to death by two Islamist extremists outside the Royal 
Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, Southeast London in May 2013; and an attempt in June 2012 by six 
Islamist extremists to carry out a lethal attack on an EDL demonstration in Dewsbury, Yorkshire. In 
the aftermath of these events the spectre of CE has been raised front and centre by academics, media 
commentators,9 and policy makers. It has also appeared in legal argumentation: during the trial of the 
Islamists who had planned to bomb the Dewsbury EDL demonstration, the prosecutor pointedly 
claimed that their actions, if successful, would have been ‘bound to draw a response in revenge from its 
target and those who sympathise with the EDL’ and ‘would most likely [have] led to a tit-for-tat spiral 
of violence and terror.’10  
 
In a broad sense, we support the main thrust of Eatwell’s initial argument that the interactional 
dynamics between opposing groups require greater and more detailed attention if we are to better 
understand the ebb and flow of ‘extremist’11 mobilisations both in the UK and elsewhere. The 
incorporation of ‘CE’12 into contemporary policy and academic debates about extremism can, and has, 
helped direct attention to the empirically well-grounded idea that community polarisation and emergent 
‘spirals of violent episodes’13 are often associated with escalating hostilities between opposing 
movements. At least in the UK, the concept of CE has also been effectively used to encourage a 
welcome adjustment to the overwhelming focus on Islamist terrorism in the immediate post-9/11 
context. Yet we would argue that more work is needed on this concept – and that in some cases greater 
care is required in its application14 – if it is to provide a useful addition to the vocabulary of scholarly and 
policy debates about extremism, radicalisation and political violence.15 
 
Two issues require particularly urgent attention. First, more precise conceptual definition is needed. In 
spite of the increased usage of ‘CE’ and cognate terms, there has been surprisingly little attempt to 
interrogate this raft of concepts, what they mean, what their parameters are and how they are used. The 
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current lack of clear conceptual definition greatly increases the chances of academics from different 
disciplines, policy makers and practitioners talking at cross-purposes with one another. It also 
undermines efforts to form a detailed analysis of when and to what degree processes of CE do actually 
take place. As Bartlett and Birdwell illustrate in their provocative essay on the popularity of the term in 
the immediate post-Woolwich context, even in the paradigmatic case of the interactions between 
extreme Islamist groups and anti-Muslim/extreme right-wing groups, it is far from clear that these 
interactions are producing a spiral of violence, or are accelerating community polarization.16 Although 
there was a sharp rise in anti-Muslim incidents following the Woolwich murder, this spike soon 
declined, as also happened following the attack on London on 7 July 2005.17 Rather than escalating 
their tactics after the killing of Lee Rigby, leaders of the EDL actually soon sought to publicly distance 
their movement from, and discourage their activists from involvement in, forms of violent retaliation 
(and within five months the senior leadership of the EDL had left the group altogether). Furthermore, 
surveys undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Lee Rigby not only indicated that 
support for the EDL actually fell rather than rose,18 but also that public attitudes towards Muslims 
appeared to be becoming marginally more positive.19   
 
The second issue concerns the absence of any concerted effort to explain why movement – 
countermovement interactions between opposing ‘extremist’ groups can have quite different 
trajectories.20 Whilst in some cases the tactical ‘innovations’ and ‘adaptations’21 of opposing movements 
might escalate towards violence, in others they might lead to the adoption of alternate but non-violent 
tactics. Similarly, whereas some movement – countermovement interactions might draw in multiple 
actors, thus expanding the contest and fuelling wider processes of communal polarisation, in other 
cases the main protagonists might become increasingly isolated from, and irrelevant to, wider political 
contests. Even within movement – countermovement contests, their interactions might generate 
different outcomes at different points in time – sometimes fueling processes of escalation, at other 
times leading to de-escalation. For example, in the 1990s, an intense and violent conflict raged on 
Britain’s streets between groups of anti-fascist and fascist activists22, arguably far more violent than that 
between Islamists and the EDL today. However, in the late 1990s this conflict eventually de-escalated, 
with a tactical innovation away from further violence on the part of the extreme right and towards 
‘community’ engagement, an innovation soon adopted by anti-fascists.23  
 
If the concepts and theories we use to explain social phenomena are to be reliable and useful, they 
ought to help us understand not only when and why these phenomena do occur, but also when they do 
not occur.24 If we do not analyse and theorise why these interactions sometimes do not escalate towards 
violence and sometimes do not lead to greater societal polarization, it is likely that CE will become a rather 
blunt analytical instrument that renders too many false positives – i.e. it will make spirals of violence 
and community polarization seem almost inevitable. Such a tendency towards risk amplification should 
be taken seriously. Apart from the fact that it may distort our understanding of the threat posed by 
political extremism at any given time25, inflated risk estimates are likely to prove financially, strategically 
and psychologically costly. As the independent reviewer of UK terrorism legislation warned in his 2013 
annual report: ‘If perception becomes detached from reality, the consequence will be unnecessary fears, 
unnecessary powers and the allocation of excessive resources to the counter-terrorism machine.’26 
Furthermore, and somewhat ironically, in the case of the contest between Islamist extremist – anti-
Muslim/extreme right wing groups in particular, there may actually be a kind of perverse symbiosis 
between discussions of CE that reproduce and amplify discourses about seemingly inevitable ‘spiral[s] 
of violence and terror’ and the narratives of the ‘extremist’ groups themselves that cohere around and 
depend upon apocalyptic warnings of inevitable ethnic and religious violence.27 
 
In this article we start to address these two issues. We do this by setting out six proposals for how talk 
of CE might be made more conceptually and analytically robust, thereby also laying a foundation for 
future research into how, and under what conditions, interactions between opposing ‘extremist’ 
movements may escalate towards violence, or may exacerbate community polarisation. Like several 
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other academics28, we believe that social movement theories in particular can contribute a great deal to 
strengthen the theoretical and conceptual apparatus used to analyze terrorism and political violence. 
Indeed, CE might be read as one form of what della Porta refers to more broadly as processes of 
‘competitive escalation’.29 As such, we ground our six proposals both in the already extensive literature 
on social movement mobilization, in particular on analyses of movement – countermovement 
interactions, and in historical case studies related, for the most part, to the mobilization and escalation 
of extreme right wing and anti-Muslim protest groups, our own primary areas of empirical research to 
date. The first three proposals relate to the description and conceptualisation of patterns of CE. 
Proposals four to six relate to the processes conceived of as being at the core of CE, i.e. the interactions 
between opposing movements. Our intention throughout this article is not to be prescriptive about 
what CE is, or ought to be conceived as. Rather our aim is to enable those who do invoke CE or a similar 
term to do so with a greater degree of precision, and to empower those who are reading or hearing 
about CE to be able to do so from a more critical perspective. 
 
Proposal One: Make clearer where reference is being made to ‘extreme’ narratives and where 
reference being made to ‘extreme’ forms of action  
 
When people make use of the term ‘CE’, are they referring to processes of ideological radicalisation– 
what in McCauley and Moskalenko’s30 terminology would be an ascent towards the top of the ‘narrative 
pyramid’ – or are they talking about an escalation of protest methods towards extra-legal and violent 
strategies – an ascent towards the higher reaches of the ‘action pyramid’? 
  
Of course, in most instances the answer is likely to be to some extent both. After all, protest narratives 
and protest actions interact with one another: the tactical choices made by social movement activists 
are shaped by the protest narratives that they and their supporters construct, and these tactical choices 
are in turn likely to shape how activists feel about their opponents and how they narrate their struggle. 
Yet, as extant research and debate on the concept of radicalisation makes quite clear, it is worth teasing 
the two apart because, while the journey of individuals or groups up or down the narrative and action 
pyramids might at times be closely inter-related, they are nonetheless distinct and discernible 
phenomena whose correlation with one another (let alone their causal relationship) is far from 
straightforward. ‘[R]adicalisation of opinion’ as McCauley and Moskalenko observe, ‘is certainly not 
always a good predictor of radicalisation of action’.31 And according to John Horgan, the idea that the 
adoption of radical ideas causes terrorism is ‘perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research’ 
because ‘[First], the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in 
violence. And second, there is increasing evidence that people who engage in terrorism don’t 
necessarily hold radical beliefs’.32  
 
Drawing on these critiques of ‘radicalisation’ debates, we urge that, in discussions about CE greater 
differentiation be made between on the one hand, processes of affirmation and validation of opposing 
world views in the face of their political opponents, and, on the other, mutual escalation of protests 
tactics towards violent action. The question this raises is how one might achieve this. We make two 
suggestions. First, and most simply, greater differentiation might be achieved through more explicit 
description of what are being treated as the indicators of CE in any given case. Second, and related to 
this, indicators should be sought that leave as little interpretive space as possible i.e. indicators ought 
not only comprise of some of the complex and on occasion rather vague terms – such as ‘increased 
community tensions’ or even ‘hate crime’ – that often populate these discussions at present, but are 
notoriously prone to challenge and contestation.33 We might, for example, start with responding to 
some straightforward questions such as: Are incidents on-line or off-line? If they are on-line, do they 
comprise generalised abuse towards a group of people (e.g. ‘Muslims’, ‘Pakis’ or ‘kuffars’), or are they 
directed at individuals? If they threaten some form of action, do these threats take the form of a 
broadly menacing statement (e.g. ‘let’s throw all Muslims out of the country’) or are they a directed 
threat of violence (e.g. ‘we are coming to burn down your mosque’). If incidents are off-line, are they 
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verbal or physical attacks? Were they carried out by individuals associated with an organised group? 
What was the degree of the verbal or physical attack – how far did it exceed established norms of 
public behaviour?  
 
Our intention is not to belittle the significance of incidents that fall short of physical violence. Abusive 
and threatening language can be deeply damaging, particularly for those at whom it is targeted, and may 
of course provoke a response that could itself contribute to some kind of CE dynamic.34 The point we 
make is simply that a clearer description of the evidence used to make claims about CE better enables 
us to interpret the prospects of contest escalation and how these change over time. Hard talk is not the 
same as action, nor is it the same as intent to cause physical harm. Whilst it is clear that the warning, 
issued by the leader of the EDL, to ‘every single Muslim watching’ that the ‘Islamic community’ would 
face ‘the full force of the English Defence League’ if any British citizen was hurt or killed,35 may serve 
to intimidate and provoke Britain’s Muslim communities, is it evidence of actual intent to commit 
violence? Similarly, whilst it may derive from deeply felt hostilities towards Muslims, when EDL 
activists mime shooting at a group of passing women who are wearing niqabs, few if any of these 
activists are expressing a serious intent to carry out an armed attack. Instead, it is in large part an act of 
bravado, a twisted joke between friends (although of course the victim of such abuse might still feel 
deeply intimidated). In a similar vein, we would contend that there are substantial differences between a 
social media ‘flame war’ such as when EDL activists and al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group aligned 
with al-Qaida, abuse each other through Twitter,36 and face-to-face confrontations between EDL and 
Islamist activists on the streets of London. Whilst both might be used to reinforce a worldview in 
which each group represents for the other the supposed barbarism that they claim to deplore, social 
media agitation requires a lower threshold of participation, as well as lower levels of planning and 
organisation. It would also seem to have a less direct relationship with the development of any ‘spiral of 
violence’.  
 
Proposal Two: Interrogate the relationship between the ‘spirals of violence’ posited at the core 
of CE, and wider processes of ‘community polarization’ 
 
To date, ‘CE’ or cognate concepts have been applied to describe social and political processes of 
varying breadth. Particularly where the terminology used has been that of ‘tit-for-tat radicalisation’37 or 
of ‘connectivity between extremisms’38, the processes have in practice been narrowly defined, and ‘CE’ 
is discussed primarily as a process undergone by the activists, supporters or sympathisers of the 
relevant ‘extremist’ groups. Yet elsewhere, ‘CE’ is used to refer to a far broader phenomenon that 
includes a more generalised deterioration of community relations. Eatwell, for example, describes both 
the increasingly tense and eventually violent interactions between extremist groups and how these 
interactions contributed to the erosion of community cohesion and ultimately to the riots that affected 
Bradford in 2001. A similar interpretation is offered by Eatwell and Goodwin who talk about both a 
‘spiral of violence’ and about processes of ‘communal polarization’ within the rubric of ‘CE’.39 Under 
this definition, we might conceive of CE as comprising two sets of processes that, whilst often closely 
related, can nonetheless be distinguished from one another. Firstly, there are the core processes of CE: 
the intensification and escalation of the contest between the opposing movements. Secondly, there are 
the processes through which these movement – countermovement contests play upon and emphasise 
extant social and political divisions.   
 
Building on Eatwell and Goodwin’s analysis, we would argue that there is considerable merit in 
examining how core CE processes intersect with wider social and political processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, and of in-group and out-group formation. Yet this raises three salient questions. First, what 
is the correlation between these ‘spirals of violence’ and ‘community polarization’? As Eatwell’s 
account40 of the disturbances in northern English towns and cities in the summer of 2001 makes clear, 
spirals of inter-group violence and processes of community polarization can on some occasions fit 
neatly and dangerously together. Sometimes, however, these processes may not be so well aligned. 
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When this is the case, whilst we might see an intensification of the contest between the opposing 
groups, we might also see a withering of wider public support for, or interest in, these groups – with 
intensifying inter-group hostilities actually bucking broader societal trends. It might even be argued that 
this is the case in relation to the current contests between anti-Muslim protest groups and extreme 
Islamist groups in the UK, where the intensification of hostilities between groups like the EDL and Al-
Muhajiroun (and its subsequent incarnations) has occurred at a time when the popularity of extreme 
Islamist positions within Britain’s Muslim communities was beginning to wane41 and where there is also 
evidence of declining public anxieties about the perceived threat of Islam and Muslims to Britain or to 
a ‘British’ way of life.42  
 
The second question concerns whether movement – countermovement interactions are actually 
facilitating the recruitment of new activists or are only really serving to sustain the commitment of 
extant activists. In other words, are these confrontations actually serving to expand the pool of support 
for the groups involved, or is their main effect to sustain or intensify the commitment and action of those 
already involved? For example, when right-wing extremists demonstrated outside Finsbury Park 
Mosque to ‘stop’ extreme Islamist cleric Abu Hamza in 2002, did these actions attract many new 
recruits for either of these opposing groups, or were those activists who took part in this series of 
protests already ‘radicalised’? Asking such questions enables us to disaggregate analyses of the 
outcomes of CE by activists’ prior involvement in similar activities, giving us a more detailed picture of 
the impacts of these contests. There is undoubtedly a difference between interactions that only attract 
the same old long-term activists, and those that draw in people who have no prior engagement in such 
groups or activities.  
 
The third question is perhaps the most fundamental: whose actions represent the core processes of 
CE? Social movements are very rarely homogeneous organizations. They tend to comprise multiple 
groups, sub-groups, factions or cliques, each of which may differ in terms of their interests, anxieties, 
sub-cultures and tactical tastes.43 Taking the UK’s anti-Muslim protest movement as an example, whilst 
this movement has been dominated by the EDL since its emergence in 2009, other groups such as 
Casuals United, North-West Infidels, or March for England sometimes collaborate and sometimes 
compete with the EDL. Each of these groups has carved out its own identity within this scene: March 
for England activists have tended to be more reluctant to adopt broader anti-Muslim rhetoric instead of 
focusing their attentions only on ‘Muslim extremists’, activists from the North-West Infidels have 
tended to advocate more radical protest tactics than the EDL leadership, and so forth. Even within the 
EDL itself, during demonstrations it has tended to be groups of younger activists who are more 
inclined to seek out opportunities for physical confrontations with opposition activists.44 As such, the 
fact that some of any given movement’s adherents might advocate or take part in violent actions does 
not mean that the movement as a whole will necessarily adopt a similar direction. Indeed, there are 
several historic examples, such as the Weather Underground, the Red Brigades, or the Red Army 
Faction, that suggest that when there is a move towards the adoption of more violent tactics, this 
process is usually undertaken by only a very small, and often marginal, group of activists that condense 
out of a much wider movement. 
 
This raises a number of challenges for analyses of CE. First, there is an obvious need to be sensitive to 
the differences and possible tensions between whole group and sub-group processes.45 Second, how do 
those who use the concept of CE situate different organisations within their accounts of CE? In 
particular, are groups generally designated ‘non-violent’ but ideologically ‘radical’ or ‘illiberal’, such as 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, conceived of as part of the core or part of the periphery? Third, how do analyses of CE 
deal with the actions of ‘solo actors’46 or breakaway groups who might claim to be affiliated with or 
inspired by known groups, but who actually have relatively little, if any, contact with that group, and 
certainly cannot claim to represent it? Even though such actors may be clearly influenced by the groups 
and milieux with which they identify, what do their actions really signify in terms of the unfolding of a 
movement – countermovement contest? For example, whilst some individual EDL members might 
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sympathise with the actions of Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, many more found his 
actions abhorrent. Similarly, those responsible for an arson attack on the Muswell Hill mosque in north 
London, daubing ‘EDL’ on its walls, may not have had anything to do with the group per se,47 but 
clearly its ‘brand’ served as an inspiration, rationalisation or justification for the perpetrators. And how 
do the actions of Pavlo Lapshyn sit within discussions of CE? A Ukrainian student on a work 
placement in England, Lapshyn murdered an 82 year-old Muslim pensioner in April 2013 before Lee 
Rigby’s murder, and then, in its aftermath, detonated a series of minor explosions outside three West 
Midlands mosques in order to ‘increase racial conflict’48 There was no evidence to suggest that 
Lapshyn’s racist terrorist campaign was incited by the killing in Woolwich.49 However, because it ran in 
parallel with its aftermath it was widely presumed contemporaneously that they were related 
phenomenon, feeding perceptions that a violent backlash was taking place.  
 
Proposal Three: Describe in detail the ebb and flow of interactions between the opposing 
‘extremist’ groups  
 
The patterns of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation between opposing ‘extremist’ groups are far 
more likely to be uneven and sporadic than they are to take the form of a steady escalation and 
intensification of hostility.50 At a meso-level, we might expect to see a clustering of interaction around 
key events. For example, the interactions between anti-Muslim groups and extreme Islamist groups in 
the UK have tended to follow in the wake of key symbolic events: the killing of Lee Rigby by two 
extremist Islamists in May 2013; the burning of a remembrance poppy at the Armistice Day ceremonies 
in 2010; the widely reported verbal abuse of British soldiers by Islamists in Luton in March 2009 or the 
protracted media-storm around the activities of Abu Hamza at Finsbury Park Mosque in 2002-5. But 
with the exception of the events in Luton in March 2009, which provided the ‘initialising event’51 for 
the forming of the EDL and therefore did generate a sustained shift in the protest dynamics, the 
intensity of the movement – countermovement contest has soon fallen back to similar levels to those 
that preceded the incident. Similar patterns have been described in the wake of the attack of 9/11 and 
other major terrorist events, where individuals or groups have sought ‘vicarious retribution’52 against 
communities deemed responsible for the attacks, but retaliatory action has soon subsided.53 And to take 
a historic example, following the ‘battle of Cable Street’ in 1936, approximately 2,000 people joined the 
British Union of Fascists, only for this support to quickly fade away.54 Similarly, at a more micro-level, 
within specific movement – countermovement encounters there are often only a limited number of 
flash points. For example, much of the public disorder and violence that has occurred during EDL 
demonstrations has centred either on the emotionally charged interactions between EDL activists and 
their opponents during demonstrations, or has taken place afterwards, when, as activists disperse and it 
becomes increasingly difficult for police to ensure that opposing activists are kept apart from one 
another.55   
 
Our third proposal is that accounts of CE should detail these meso- and micro-level patterns within 
contests between ‘extremist’ groups, paying attention both to the peaks and to the troughs of activity. 
This would sharpen our analyses of CE in two important ways. Firstly, it would provide a more precise 
picture of the trajectory of the contest than that which emerges when the focus is primarily on the 
spikes of action. We should not only be asking why the intensity of these contests increases and how 
quickly, but also how quickly these spikes drop away, and whether activity falls back to previous levels.   
 
Secondly, detailing these meso- and micro-level patterns also encourages closer scrutiny of what we 
refer to as the different wavelengths of CE. Following McCauley and Moskalenko’s analysis of the 
processes of radicalisation,56 CE, we propose, operates both through shorter-wave and longer-wave 
social and psychological processes. On the one hand, movement – countermovement interactions are 
shaped by the longer-term formation of in-group and out-group boundaries, the production and 
reproduction of interpretive frames, the nurturing of resentments, grievances and hatred, and the 
strategic positioning of groups in relation to political opportunity structures. Yet these contests are also 
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shaped by shorter-wave processes. They might be fashioned, for example, by a series of tactical 
exchanges between opposing groups – e.g. after having their demonstration curtailed by counter-
demonstrators one week, the following week activists decide that they will disrupt a rally being held by 
their opponents. They will also be shaped by activists’ cognitive and emotional responses to the actions 
of their fellow activists or opponents, such as outrage when the core symbols of their in-group are 
desecrated, the desire to show solidarity with their fellow activists, or even the thrill of confrontation.57  
 
Of course, these shorter-wave and longer-wave processes intersect with one another. In-group and out-
group identities are often forged through action (the arguments on Facebook, the response of one 
activist to the banner of an opponent, etc.).58 Conversely, action gains impetus from, and is given 
meaning by, these longer-wave processes. However, being sensitive to the differences between longer 
and shorter-wave processes enables a more nuanced interpretation of events. We might, for example, 
want to reflect on the differences between those actions carried out on the ‘day of anger’ – that 
relatively brief period of time when feelings of outrage can seem almost to compel people to action – 
and those carried out on the ‘day of revenge’ – when those initial feelings of outrage will first have 
subsided and then have been transformed into something such as a more elaborate justification or 
rationale for action.59 It also informs what ought to be one of the key questions for analysing CE: what 
is the relationship between the shorter-wave social and psychological processes associated with the 
occasional flaring up of movement – countermovement interactions and the longer-wave construction 
of oppositional identities, resentment and mutual loathing? How do the shorter-wave arguments, 
confrontations, and emotional reflexes contribute to and fuel the longer-wave construction of 
oppositional identities and animosities (and what can be done to interrupt these pathways)? One of the 
principle drawbacks in conceiving of CE as a process of ‘tit-for-tat’ radicalisation is that it would seem 
to do little to encourage this kind of reflection on the interactions between multiple wavelengths of CE.   
 
Proposal Four: Attend to the multiple pathways of movement – countermovement influence 
 
In their discussion of patterns of social movement mobilisation, Oliver and Myers observe that whilst 
you have to draw boundaries around a problem in order to study it, ‘if you draw the boundaries too 
narrowly, you can mis-specify the problem and generate seriously erroneous conclusions about cause-
effect relationships’.60 We would argue that, to date, accounts of CE, and especially accounts that frame 
CE as a ‘tit-for-tat’ process, have tended to draw their boundaries too narrowly by focusing their 
attention primarily on just one form of movement – countermovement influence: namely, where 
opposing movements provoke a response by antagonising one another. 
 
Analyses of social movement interactions actually suggest a wide spectrum of interactional effects and 
pathways between opposing movements. Some of these comprise other forms of direct impacts.61 
Movements might, for example, encourage countermovement mobilisation through a ‘demonstration 
effect’, by indicating to rivals ‘that collective action can effect (or resist) change in particular aspects of 
society’62. Opposing movements may also have a direct impact on one another through the cycles of 
tactical and symbolic innovation and adaptation in which the engage.63 As opposing movements seek to 
outmanoeuvre one another, they might emulate, imitate, learn from, subvert and invert one another’s 
strategies, images and symbols, generating a cultural and political syncretism that feeds a co-production 
of collective action frames and may fuel the diffusion of similar protest tactics across multiple social 
movements.64 This has been the case, for example, with the ‘autonomous nationalists’ in Europe, who 
have self-consciously adopted the style and strategies of the anarchist ‘black bloc’ whilst retaining a very 
different ideological core.65  
  
Furthermore, opposing movements might also influence each other through indirect effects – by altering 
the cultural, political or legal environment in which each side operates.66 When one group develops new 
modes of action or new interpretive frames they elicit responses not only from opposition groups, but 
also from other actors such as the state, the media, or sections of the general public, whose actions may 
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alter political or media agendas and even the linguistic terrain used to define the terms of debate. One 
recent example of this in the UK is how the political narratives and policy frameworks dealing with 
‘radicalisation’ that emerged initially as a response to Islamist extremism have also come to form the 
basis of the response to the threat of the right-wing extremism.67 Similarly, legislation and police 
powers brought in to deal with one protest group may also be used to respond to others – a case in 
point being the 1936 Public Order Act which entered the statute books to counter British fascism but 
was regularly used thereafter to inhibit left-wing protests. These environmental changes in turn require 
tactical or ideological innovation by other protest groups (opposing or otherwise) operating within that 
environment, producing what della Porta and Tarrow call an ‘interactive diffusion’ of tactics.68  
 
If we are to develop accurate understandings and interpretations of how and why patterns of CE 
develop, or do not develop as the case may be, due attention must be paid to these multiple pathways 
of influence. One way to achieve this would be to shift away from treating CE as a binary process 
involving two (or perhaps three) extremist groups, and instead conceive of CE as a broader process of 
‘coevolution’ involving multiple actors.69 The social movements literature suggests four broad 
categories of actors whose actions are likely to be of particular significance to analyses of CE. The first 
are other social movement groups. In practice, movement – countermovement contests rarely involve 
only two movements, with most groups having more than one opponent. For example, closer 
inspection of the contest between extreme right wing, anti-Muslim and extreme Islamist groups in 
Britain, reveals a multiplicity of social movement actors with different aims, motivations and ideological 
alignments.70 As well as clashing with extreme Islamist groups, EDL activists also often clash with an 
assortment of left-wing, anti-fascist and Muslim groups as well as with groups of local youths (usually 
from black and minority ethnic groups) who might not be aligned with any particular social 
movement.71 And although there have been some efforts to forge coalitions between anti-fascist and 
Muslim groups72, these various opponents of the EDL could scarcely be portrayed as a coherent 
opposition. Some parts of the anti-fascist and Islamist movements in particular are highly critical of one 
another, opposing each other on issues such as the human rights of homosexuals and the diffusion of 
sharia law.73 Indeed, even within anti-fascist movements there have been bitter arguments about how to 
respond to groups like the EDL; a fact which links to the related point that it is often competition 
between groups from within the same social movement as much as reactions against groups from 
opposing social movements that shapes the evolution of activists’ collective action frames and tactical 
choices.74  
 
A second group comprises the various state actors (national and local government as well as law 
enforcement agencies) whose actions or inaction can influence the dynamics of movement – 
countermovement contests. The state might, for example, impose outright bans on some groups; new 
legislation, increased police powers, heavier sentencing or more restrictive bail conditions may be used 
to deter certain forms of protest action (although, as we discuss below, sometimes these measures may 
have unintended consequences); and state actors may also seek to manipulate the direction of protest 
groups through ‘covert’ or undercover operations.75 And even beyond these more high profile 
interventions, there are a host of other actors – youth workers, neighbourhood police officers, local 
schools etc – whose actions alter the terrain of extant movement - countermovement conflicts through 
initiatives such as school partnering programmes, police campaigns to inform young people about the 
possible consequences of participation in demonstrations, or strategically arranged ‘away days’ to take 
young people out of the area when demonstrations are planned.76 Of course, in some contexts state 
actors might also be a direct target of or might even collude with one of the opposing groups.77  
 
A third group of actors are the media and, increasingly, those who set social media agendas. By shaping 
the ‘discursive opportunities’ for political violence, these actors mediate between political opportunity 
structures and political action.78 Most simply, media agendas might coincide with and therefore fuel 
activist narratives and grievances. This has arguably been the case where EDL activists have seized 
upon media representations of Muslims in parts of the British press to justify their cause.79 There are 
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also more direct forms of interaction between media actors and movement activists. Most modern 
protest groups deliberately court the media, and at least to some extent script their demonstrations to 
gain maximum media attention. Yet the media has also deliberately sought out ‘controversial’ guests 
such as extreme Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary who appeared on several news programmes in the 
wake of Lee Rigby’s murder (leading to an investigation by the broadcasting regulator Ofcom following 
viewer complaints and condemnation from other media outlets). On other occasions media outlets 
have engaged in directly provocative behaviour. The Sun newspaper, for instance, ‘in an attempt to 
galvanise the kind of confrontation that would make good copy’, sent a ‘battle bus’ complete with Page 
3 models to North London where extreme Islamists were protesting after being locked out of the 
Finsbury Park mosque, and where extreme right-wing activists had gathered to demonstrate against 
them.80 Media actors have even been the focus of collective action, such as where the stories they have 
printed about groups like the EDL have sparked protests outside newspaper offices, veiled threats and 
even direct assaults on journalists – including an instance of one photojournalist being set alight.81  
 
The fourth group are those individuals or groups who hold special symbolic value for the activist 
groups. These may include the victims of an outrage around which one of the competing groups seeks 
to mobilise, for instance, the family or the regiment of Lee Rigby in the wake of his killing. Decisive 
action by these individuals can do much to shape the course of movement – countermovement 
contests, at least in the short term. For example, in all probability the strongly worded condemnation 
by Lee Rigby’s regiment and family denouncing any retaliatory protests curtailed the backlash to his 
killing (particularly from those activists whose self-professed patriotism and desire to protest had to be 
squared with a desire to be seen to be respecting the wishes of Lee Rigby’s family and colleagues). 
Other actors who might fall within this group are those whose social or professional position affords 
them particularly high status within the worldview of one or other of the activist groups such as, in the 
case of groups like the EDL or the BNP, those who are members of the British armed forces. 
 
Proposal Five: Examine how the wider cultural, social and political environment might shape 
the movement – countermovement contest  
 
What research on social movements also makes clear is that there are a number of environmental 
variables that are likely to either intensify or dampen movement - countermovement contests.82 Our 
analyses of CE, and in particular the assessments made of the risk of contest escalation, can therefore 
also be enriched if they situate these contests in relation to their wider cultural, social and political 
environment. Whilst a full review of such environmental variables goes beyond the scope of this paper, 
some of the most salient of these variables might include:  
 
The ‘cultural resonance’83 of movement – countermovement framing contests 
  
To what extent do the opposing groups’ narratives coincide with popular perceptions of the challenges 
facing or of tensions within society? And to what extent do they coincide with ‘media attention 
cycle[s]’84?  Where their competing narratives – the ‘framing contest’85 between the groups – have 
greater cultural resonance, it is more likely that the groups will attract attention and generate active 
and/or latent support, in turn making it more likely that the movement-countermovement contest 
translates into a wider process of community polarization. Where these framing contests don’t have 
such cultural resonance, whilst two extremist groups might find themselves locked into an increasingly 
antagonistic relationship with one another, we might expect the process of CE to remain relatively 
contained. In the case of the interactions between the anti-Muslim protest groups and Islamic extremist 
groups in the UK, both groups have gained energy from the way that their collective action frames 
have coincided with public discourses about the ‘clash of civilisations’ – the idea that contemporary 
conflicts will centre not so much on competition between states for control of economic or political 
resources as on supranational and supposedly intractable cultural differences86. Indeed, they have 
sufficient resonance with public and media discourses that, even though the individual groups are to a 
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large extent positioned by mainstream political and media actors as pariahs, they are able to attract 
substantial attention and persuade a minority of the public that theirs is a cause that warrants support. 
 
‘Open’ versus ‘closed’ policy issues 
  
Movements are most likely to mobilise both proactively and reactively around such ‘open’ rather than 
around more ‘closed’ issues - around issues where there is extant policy and public debate.87 Thus one 
factor that might alter the CE dynamic is the extent to which either the state or one of the competing 
movements is able to close the issue. In this regard, it might be argued that issues relating to race, 
religion or national identity would seem particularly amenable to prolonged movement – 
countermovement contests (which may or may not escalate depending on other relevant variables) 
since they are almost impossible to ‘close’. 
 
The extent and nature of opportunities for contact between opposing activists 
  
The arguments and confrontations that take place when activists come into contact with one another 
not only become an integral part of activists’ mythologies and collective action frames, but also provide 
social movement activists and groups with an important and lasting source of what Randall Collins calls 
‘emotional energy’88. Thus, another key question ought to be about the extent and nature of the 
opportunities for contact between opposing activists and whether these contacts are more or less 
conducive to contest escalation or de-escalation. Of particular interest to the analysis of contemporary 
cases is how new opportunities for contact generated by digital technologies affect the picture. For 
example, whilst opposing groups of activists are in some respects likely to have greater access to one 
another through social media and web-forums, is the emotional energy that these encounters generate 
comparable with that generated when activists come face-to-face on the street? What differences are 
there between online and offline encounters in terms of the way that they contribute to solidifying, 
polarising and radicalising group identities?  
 
Legislative and policing environment 
 
Another important environmental factor, and one that relates to the previous discussion about the 
multiple actors that shape CE processes, concerns the legislation and policing tactics used to control 
collective action by social movement groups. More ‘repressive’ legal and policing contexts may reduce 
overall levels of protest and limit opportunities to deploy certain protest tactics. Yet more repressive 
measures can also have unintended consequences, particularly if they create the kind of crisis situations 
that enable social and political movements to achieve greater leverage. There is also evidence that while 
repressive action by governments and elites might reduce protest, it may increase militancy.89 The 
experience of ‘suffered violence’90 as a result of repressive action can provoke anger, resentment and 
narratives of ‘victimhood’ and ‘persecution’ amongst activists, leading to sub-group radicalisation 
towards violence. In Germany, for example, whilst outright bans have made certain modes of 
mobilisation more difficult, they have also forced militants from banned organisations to engage in 
creative ‘learning processes’, such as fostering ‘fragmentation’ as a ‘tactical ploy’. This, arguably, has 
made policing such groups harder by displacing activism into other arenas rather than eradicating it.91   
 
Extant protest repertoires 
  
Finally, whilst there is always scope for tactical innovation, activists’ choices about how they make their 
claims are shaped by what Charles Tilly famously called protest repertoires92 – extant recognised forms 
of collective action and claims making. It would seem incumbent on those analysing processes of CE, 
and in particular those with an interest in assessing the risk of tactical escalation, to look closely at 
which repertoires of protest the opposing groups appear to draw on, and how these repertoires change 
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over time (and it might also be the case that the competing groups do not draw entirely from the same 
repertoire, especially where groups are situated within radically different political or social cultures).  
Proposal Six: Examine how the relevant movements and countermovements are coupled 
 
Even where there is a spiral of hostile and violent interactions between movements and 
countermovements, groups’ reactions to one another will rarely, if ever, comprise of a crude series of 
‘dog-whistle’ responses. This is because a social movement’s reactions to other actors – be they other 
social movements, state agencies etc – are also shaped by a number of other factors that include the 
movement’s position in relation to political opportunity structures93, the capabilities of the movement 
to carry out certain forms of action94, the movement’s organizational structure95, movement identities96, 
and extant protest repertoires97. The final proposal we make is that greater attention be given to the 
subtleties of how the opposing groups respond to one another or are ‘coupled’.98  
 
There are two coupling issues that are especially salient to discussions of CE. The first of these 
concerns what we refer to as the possible asymmetries of movement coupling. As has been observed 
elsewhere, opposing movements might be more or less ‘tightly coupled’ or ‘loosely coupled’ (and these 
patterns of coupling may to change over time).99 Where movements are tightly coupled we would 
expect to see frequent, direct counter-demonstrations; the regular borrowing and inverting of one 
another’s language and symbols; or rapid cycles of tactical innovation and adaptation.100 Where 
movements are more loosely coupled, whilst they might broadly oppose what one another stands for, 
their campaigns would be less likely to be organised in direct opposition to one another; there might be 
a slower and less obviously demarcated tactical innovation – adaptation cycle; and there might be fewer 
direct counters to or subversions of one another’s symbols and claims. Yet it is possible, if not likely, 
that within movement – countermovement pairings there is one movement that is in effect more tightly 
coupled to its opponent than vice versa i.e. movement A is more focused on, and reactive to, 
movement B than movement B is to movement A. This might happen because movement B perceives 
there to be less value in, or need to respond to, movement A, perhaps because they are more focused 
on other opponents (either other social movements or the state)101, or because they don’t assess 
movement A as a particularly significant challenger and therefore judge that they ‘do not require [the] 
movement’s full attention’.102 This kind of asymmetric coupling can be seen in the case of the contest 
between parts of the extreme Islamist milieu and groups like the EDL. Whilst the EDL and other 
‘counter-jihad’ activists owe much of their ideological development and collective action frame to the 
activities of, and their encounters with, extreme Islamist groups, generally speaking the goals, beliefs, 
tactics and propensity towards violence of the latter, have not evolved substantially in response to the 
activities of extreme right-wing and anti-Muslim groups, and do not provide the main focus for the 
construction either of their protest narratives or actions.103 In this particular case, the coupling pattern 
at least in part reflects asymmetrical ideological alignment – while for groups like the EDL, ‘Islam’ is a 
political concern sin qua non, for extreme Islamist groups their primary concern is with challenging the 
secular authority of Western states. 
 
The second issue relates back to our first proposal about the need to distinguish between ‘extreme’ 
narratives and ‘extreme’ actions. Even where a movement’s protest narrative might be shaped by and 
focused on the actions of an opposition movement, it does not necessarily follow that they will also 
imitate, emulate or seek to ‘outbid’ that opponent’s protest tactics.104 In other words, it is quite 
conceivable that opposing or rival movements might be tightly coupled in terms of their rhetoric and 
interpretive frames, but are more loosely coupled with regard to their protest tactics. For example, 
whilst there is some tactical and symbolic imitation and borrowing between EDL and extreme Islamist 
activists, lending a certain symmetry to this contest (for example, Islamist extremists burning poppies 
and right-wing extremists burning the Koran), there are also notable points of divergence. Within this 
particular contest, extreme Islamist activists have shown a far greater propensity towards the use of 
lethal force than their anti-Muslim opponents, and whereas EDL leaders have publicly criticised violent 
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actions such as Anders Breivik’s killing spree and attacks carried out on mosques, Anjem Choudary 
made a point of not ‘abhoring’ the killing of Lee Rigby when asked about the on the BBC’s Newsnight 
programme.105 
 
Extant theories about protest cycles and the development of protest repertoires again offer several 
explanations for these kinds of coupling patterns. Opposing movements will almost inevitably be 
situated differently within political opportunity structures since each group ‘has its own allies and its 
own relationship to authorities, and each is a component in the political opportunity structure the other 
confronts’.106 At least in mature democracies, we might expect groups that perceive themselves to have 
a greater stake in the mainstream political system to pursue their demands through more 
institutionalised modes of protest.107 Opposing movements are also likely to have different tactical 
capabilities depending on the different economic, social and human capital that they have at their 
disposal. The football terrace and an Afghan training camp provide quite different skill sets, capabilities 
and ambitions. 
  
There are also explanations associated with movement symbols and identities. Social movement 
activists are relatively unlikely to adopt tactics from other groups if such tactics would seriously diverge 
from the established movement symbols and undermine movement identities108 - organisations that do 
so are more likely to collapse or disband.109 We might therefore expect transference of tactics between 
opposing movements to be particularly limited where the movements in question draw on quite 
different repertoires of action and where their movement identities are grounded in substantially 
different structures of legitimation. For example, in spite of their bluster, the range of protest actions 
available to the EDL has to date been constrained by the fact that most EDL demonstrations are 
predicated on the performance of respect for the secular authority of the state, and it has in fact been 
the frequent failure of the EDL to observe generally accepted parameters of lawful protest that has 
been one of the main sources of tension within the movement.110 Activists in the most extreme Islamist 
groups, for whom it is precisely these structures of authority and legitimacy that they are seeking to 
undermine, do not necessarily face the same symbolic constraints.  
 
Finally, disposition towards the adoption of extreme tactics may also be affected by the position of the 
groups within their own organizational life cycles. Crudely put, most social movement groups 
experience an initial period of growth followed by a period of stagnation after which they either evolve 
or decline, perhaps with intermittent periods of revival during the decline.111 Extant research indicates 
that tactical radicalisation is more likely during the latter stages of this cycle – a pattern for which there 
may be numerous explanations: a sense among activists that they have failed to meet initial aims using 
the established tactical repertoire;112 increased organizational density;113 competition over diminishing 
resources;114 a fragmentation of power that undermines movement discipline;115 or attempts by 
struggling leaders to reanimate their supporters or re-establish authority.116 Where opposing 
movements are at different points of their own movement cycles, this might also increase the 
probability that they are differentially inclined towards radical or violent action.  
 
The variability of coupling patterns demand that researchers and policy makers take account, not just of 
whether two or more opposing groups respond to one another, but how they respond to one another 
and the differential impacts that these movements have on one another. It also raises one of the most 
challenging and delicate questions for researchers, policy makers and law enforcement agencies working 
in this area: to what extent should or can the opposing movements engaged in any given CE dynamic 
be treated as functional equivalents of one another? There are multiple incentives to conceiving of both 
parties as two sides of the ‘same coin of hate’117 or as a ‘mirror image’118 of one another. Besides the 
rhetorical allure of such metaphors, they can also be effective campaign tools - the campaigns by 
groups like the Hope Not Hate and the opprobrium expressed by the main political parties have done 
much to undermine public support for groups like the EDL and BNP. Furthermore, this kind of 
language can also help those in the political mainstream (or aspiring to be in the political mainstream) 
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to distance themselves from any accusations of being in some way ‘soft’ on extremists, and can be used 
to reinforce claims to even-handedness: the ‘you’re both as bad as each other’ strategy well practiced by 
school teachers or those seeking to referee between squabbling children. Yet opposing groups might 
not always be as imminently dangerous as one another. This might not be because their protest 
narratives are any less extreme or noxious, but due to the fact that they are embedded within different 
protest cultures, have different organisational capabilities, or are engaged in quite different series of 
strategic interactions with other actors.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Championed by prominent political scientists such as Roger Eatwell, Matthew Goodwin and Magnus 
Ranstorp, CE and other cognate terms have become part of the conceptual apparatus of contemporary 
debates about extremism, terrorism and political violence. This has particularly been the case in relation 
to extant contests between extreme Islamist and anti-Muslim/extreme right-wing groups. Our aim in 
this article has been both pragmatic and relatively modest: to make a series of proposals about how to 
tighten up the concept of CE so that it might provide a useful contribution to these debates, rather 
than ending up as another example of what John Horgan might call an ‘explanatory fiction’119 – an idea 
that appears to enable us to explain a great deal, but whose explanatory value is largely lost due to 
insufficient scrutiny of how the concept is operationalized. Our six proposals have been as follows: 
1. Make clearer where reference is being made to distinction between ‘extreme’ narratives and 
where reference being made to ‘extreme’ forms of action; 
2. Interrogate the relationship between the ‘spirals of violence’ posited at the core of CE, and 
wider processes of ‘community polarization’; 
3. Describe in detail the ebb and flow of interactions between the opposing ‘extremist’ groups; 
4. Attend to the multiple pathways of movement – countermovement influence; 
5. Examine how the wider cultural, social and political environment might shape the movement – 
countermovement contest; 
6. Examine how the relevant movements and countermovements are coupled. 
As these proposals are intended to provide a more solid platform for further research on processes of 
CE, we conclude with three brief suggestions about possible directions for such future research. First, 
and as we indicated in the introduction to this article, there is a need for cross-case comparative 
analyses of the diverse trajectories of movement – countermovement contests between ‘extremist’ 
groups. Second, as McCauley and Moskalenko observe, the emotional intensification of conflict at a 
micro-level and the narratives that this provides individual activists is often missing from the debate on 
violent radicalisation.120 As such, while this article has been largely concerned with group processes, 
future research on CE would benefit from approaches that combine group level analysis with analysis 
of individual participation in and experiences of political extremism and violent action. Finally, if we are 
to take seriously the idea that CE is a process of coevolution that involves multiple actors and not just the two 
opposing ‘extremist’ groups, another valuable avenue for research would be to undertake a more reflexive 
analysis of how the debates about and efforts to countermand CE are shaping our societies’ 
interpretations of and responses to the threat of terrorism and political violence. 
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